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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
APEX LUMBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
-vs-
COMANCHE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK, 
AND MORONI FEED COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APEX LUMBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
-vs-
COMANCHE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK 
and D. A. SHAND, 
Defendants-Respondents 
APEX LUMBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
-vs-
COMANCHE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK 
and HOW ARD WILLARDSEN", 
Defendants-Respondents 
APEX LUMBER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
-vs-
COMANCHE CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, RAYMOND CLARK 
and RICHARD JENSEN, 
Defendants-Respondents 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10414 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Respondent agrees with the Appellant's statement 
as to the kind of case. Defendants Moroni Feed Company, D 
A. Shand, Howard Willardson and Richard Jensen denied 
liability for the reason that the plaintiff-appellant so mixed up 
materials between the thirteen different pole barn construction 
jobs that it was not possible to determine 'Nhich materials 
went into which pole barn. Each defendant claimed that he 
had paid for all the material that went into his building. Each 
Respondent claimed that the appellant was further estopped 
from its claims against th'2 said Respondent because ~f a 
telephone conversation advising respondents to make payment 
to Comanche Construction Company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Respondent's generally agree with the Appellant's 
statement as to the disposition in the lower court. The parties 
named as Comanche Construction Company and Raymond 
Clark were never served in any of the four cases and neither 
have ever entered an appearance. 
The four cases were joined for purposes of trial and 
were tried together before a jury. The Court propounded 
six written questions in each case and the Jury answered the 
questions in each case generally the same. The answers were 
to the effect that the Appellant did furnish the materials that 
went into the buildings, that the materials had been paid for 
and that the plaintiff-appellant received a telephone call from 
respondents before they made final payment, asking if pay-
ment should be made to Comanche or held up. That the 
Appellant through a Mr. Rasmussen whom the jury held was 
authorized to act, advised the Respondents to go ahead and 
pay Comanche Construction Company for the buildings, which 
they did. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents' deny that appellant should have a revers-
al of the lower court's judgment which was based upon special 
verdicts submitted to the Jury. The entire course of conduct 
by appellant with Raymond Clark and Comanche Construction 
Company in the 13 constructed pole barns shows a confusion 
2 
of material and payments. 
The appellant's specific conduct with the Respondents 
is an adequate basis for appellant's legal remedies to be es-
topped in equity. The Jury after hearing all the evidences 
so found by its answers to special verdict, as did the lower 
court in entering its decision of no cause of action in each of 
the cases. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents agree generally with the statement of 
facts set forth in Appellant's brief. 
Thirteen pole barn buildings were constructed starting 
and ending with the dates stated. The plaintiffs witness Guy 
Pittman, the Construction Supervisor, testified that men and 
materials were shifted from one job to another. (T-80) 
MR. TIBBS RE-CROSS EXAMINATION OF GUY 
PITTMAN. 
"Q. You had fourteen men working for you, didn't you? 
"A. Approximately, Donald. 
"Q. Your primary interest was keeping this labor 
moving? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. You were moving these men and these trucks and 
this material to keep them busy. This is the 
primary purpose, wasn't it? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And you kept them busy whether you had to move 
some material over here or material over there 
or anywhere you needed it, didn't you? 
"A. That is right. 
Other witnesses testified that the materials were moved 
between the jobs - Charles DeVon Beck (P. 179 line 27), 
Mark Christensen testified he loaned Comanche Construction 
Company a truck which was used to haul materials between 
jobs (P. 186), Cliff Blackham saw materials moving on trucks 
(p. 191). The Respondents, Dick Jensen (p. 213-217), Howard 
Willardsen (p. 223-224), Arthur Shand (234, 235, 240), all 
saw materials moved to and from their premises. 
The three Respondents (Shand, Jensen and Willardsen) 
pole barns were the same size. The Respondent Moroni Feed 
Company's pole barn was substantially larger, yet the amount 
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appellant claimed from Moroni Feed Company was smaller 
than the amounts claimed from some of the other Respondent 
Defendants. In answer to questions concerning this problezn 
the General Manager of Appellant stated: (T. 76) 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF C. H. CHILD BY DON 
V. TIBBS: 
"Q. (By Mr. Tibbs) Well, in any event Moroni Feed is 
fifty percent, or fifty feet longer in length, pl\15 
it also has the addition on; right? 
"A. Right. It should cost more money. 
"Q. And so if the claimant was saying that there was 
four thousand six hundred dollars, roughly, or 
let's make it exact, four thousand six hundred 
seventy-seven dollars eighty cents worth of mater-
ials in the Moroni Feed Company building, and 
was saying there was four thousand nine hundred 
forty dollars worth of materials in the Dick Jen-
sen building there i.s something wrong. Isn't that 
true? 
"A. It doesn't add up. The cost of your material in 
these buildings costs roughly between sixty and 
sixty-five cents a square foot. 
"Q. E.specially doesn't add up when you analyze the 
extra fifty feet, plus the extra thirty-two feet, does 
it? Well, it doesn't add up, does it? 
"A. No." 
The appellant's basis for holding the respondents liable 
for their materials was on the application of payments received 
from Raymond Clark, doing business as Comanche Construc-
tion Company. One of the last pole barns constructed was 
for Bruce Barton. He was never sued by Appellant. Seven 
other law suits were filed. Mr. Child, Appellant's General 
Manager applied an $8000.00 payment received from 
Comanche Construction Company on the Barton obligation, 
(a building constructed after the Respondents' buildings 
were completed), rather than on Respondent's alleged 
obligation. (T. 157). Mr. Bruce Barton testified (T. 188) 
that he paid for his pole barn just like the other farmers, 
and that he did not ask for lien waivers. (T. 189, Line 7). 
Mr. Child, Appellant's General Manager, testified on 
cross examination that the payments were applied to the old-
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est job except for Barton payment. (T. 133, 134). His testi-
mony at time of trial was compared with his testimony given 
at the time of an earlier deposition on September 8, 1964. 
(P. 157.) 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
(By Mr. Tibbs) Now, Mr. Child, on your direct 
testimony you indicated that as to the application 
of this eight thousand dollars that Mr. Clark came 
in to your office in the Spring of 1961 when that 
eight thousand dollars was paid, and you had a 
conversation with him wherein at that time he 
told you that eight thousand was to be applied 
against the Barton obligation? 
That is correct. 
Is that - and that Barton obligation was the last 
job. Isn't that right? 
No. The Barton - -
"Q. Other than these two northern jobs? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And in the event he hadn't been in the office and 
hadn't said to apply it that way, then it would 
have applied earlier on the chain and would have 
wiped out, according to your diagram and your 
exhibit that was introduced, for all practical 
purposes, the Shand and the Willardsen job. Isn't 
that right? 
"A. It woul.d And it would have put Barton in their 
place. 
"Q. That is right. Now in September 8, 1964, I took 
your deposition in this matter. Isn't that true? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. And I asked you about the application of pay-
ment in that deposition to your recollection. 
Isn't that true? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. And isn't it a fact that I asked you specifically 
concerning this, and all you would answer to me 
that it was just a possibility that this was the 
case and that you at no time told me that there 
was a direct conversation concerning this matter. 
Isn't that true? 
"A. I don't recall telling you that there was no con-
versation about the matter. 
"Q. All right. May I read the deposition to you. This 
is on, I am on page 22 of the deposition starting 
at the last sentence - - - (down to page 159 line 7) 
" 'Q. I assume by that you said, then, that the rea-
son the other, that this last group of jobs. 
this last six, which also includes Barton and 
Mark Christensen. as I recall, the reason 
that they weren't sued, was because at the 
time the money was sent a specific lien waiv-
er was asked upon those jobs. Is that correct':' 
"'A. Well, this is a possibility. 
" 'Q. Either that or the jobs were ordered before 
these particular jobs were ordered? 
"'A. Right. 
"'Q. The others? 
"'A. Yes. 
"'Q. When these invoices or these cheks were 
received from Clark or Comanche Company 
or Comanche Lumber, did the checks them-
selves specify on whose account they were 
to apply? 
" 'A. They were not. 
"'Q. None. Is that correct? 
"'A. Only the ones in which he requested lien 
waivers, and he would say this check in-
cludes payment for the particular job and 
please furnish me a lien waiver on it. I 
assume, that is the way you said, I assume. 
" 'Q. So that that would have been a separate let-
ter correspondence rather than by the check 
itself. Is that correct? 
"'A. That is correct. 
" 'Q. So that once again the drafts or checks them-
selves individually would not specify any 
particular account which they were to be 
applied against? 
"'A. Correct. 
" 'Q. And it was correspondence which came with 
the draft? 
"'A. Yes. 
" 'Q. Do you have this correspondence? 
"'A. No. I do not. 
"'Q. Is that your testimony? 
"'A. It is. 
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"Q. (By Mr. Tibbs) Let me just read the next ques-
tion and answer. After you said no, I do not, 
I said: 
"'Q. Did you return it or did you keep it? 
"'A. Well, this happened four years ago and I am 
not sure. Sometimes it would appear on just 
a hand-written note with check, please mail 
me a lien waiver for such and such a job, 
and I just didn't keep it at all, where it may 
have been in a letter relative to some other 
item, and I just didn't keep all that corres-
pondence. 
" 'Q. The way you answer this indicates that may-
be the check came in an envelope and there 
was a sheet of paper with the check which 
says please send me a waiver for Bruce 
Barton's job? 
" 'A. That is a possibility. 
"Q. In any event now you say it didn't happen that 
way at all. Now he crone specifically in to your 
office and he handed you the check for eight 
thousand dollars and he said apply this on Bruce 
Barton's account. That is correct? That is your 
testimony now? 
"A. Regarding the eight thousand dollar check, Mr. 
Clark brought that in hand to my office. 
"Q. That is in variance with your prior testimony, is 
it not? 
"A. No. I think it is not. 
Obviously this evidence shows a misapplication of the 
$8,000.00 payment. The manager Child was flock shooting 
whichever builder-farmer he thought he could get payment 
from. His first testimony was that he applied the $8,000.00 
based upon correspondence, (which was never in existence), 
then at the time of trial he applied the payment on Barton 
Pole barn based on an oral conversation, which Barton has 
no knowledge of and which was never requested by Barton 
from Comanche Construction Company. 
There was also evidence presented wherein the appell-
ant by its General Manager C. H. Child received two Pro-
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mi!':sot·y Notes. The Respondents cuntendcd these noi.cs were 
taken in satisfaction c.nd payment of the Apex account with 
Raymond Clark, doing business as Comanche Ccnstruction 
Company. The Court refused to submit this to the Jury over 
the objection of Respondents' cow1sel. See Instructions that 
were denied. 
The Jury undoubtedly considered this in its Answer 
to Special Verdict question No. 3. However, even if they did 
and should not have, there was sufficient other evidence to 
subst;;:.ntiate the basis of their answers to the question. This 
was so four:.d by the court. 
Although the Respondents rely particularly upon the 
doctrine of estoppel it is noted that based upon the circum-
stances herein involved the question of payment because of 
the acceptance of the Promissory notes should have been 
submitted to the Jury. Originally appellant was dealing with 
Raymond Clark doing business as Comanche Construction. 
After the transaction occurrE'<l a corporation was formed 
known as Comanche Construction Company, Inc. The account 
between Clark and Apex Lumber was in dispute as shown 
by the Exhibits 47 and 48. Two Promissory Notes were de-
livered by the third party, Comanche Construction Company, 
a corporation, for a sum certain. See Exhibit 35 and 36. These 
notes provided for interest different from the open account 
and were given as security. The fact that they were 
not subsequently paid should not say they were not accepted 
as payment, and it should have been a question for the Jury 
to determine, if, in fact, they had been taken as payment. 
This the Jury apparently did in its answer to question No. 3. 
The fact that they did should not now be determined to have 
affected all other payment and evidence presented in the case. 
There was also evidence to the effect that some of the 
appellant's billings were not correct as to the materials that 
went into the particular buildings. Appellant's testimony as 
to the nails is a good example. (T. 138) 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT GENERAL 
MANAGER CIBLD. 
"Q. So that on this particular job there is roughly four 
hundred pounds of particular nails which on the 
other job there is about one hundred pounds. Is 
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that right? Is that right? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. And then there is another four hundred pounds 
of nails just below that, where on the other jobs 
there is what, three hundred pounds? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. So there is quite a substantial variance of nails 
between Richard Jensen's job and Art Shand's job, 
for example, isn't there? 
"A. Yes. And these nails would be twenty-five dollars 
per keg, so there is seventy-five dollars difference 
worth of nails on the two. 
"Q. But the point is, and you understand this point, 
that if the nails didn't go into Mr. Jensen's job 
then h~ shouldn't have to pay for the nails, should 
he? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Not under this theory that you are proceeding 
under. Actually in this theory, he should only pay 
for the materials that went in that have not been 
paid for. Isn't that true? 
"A. That is correct. 
The Respondents testified, Arthur Shand (T. 236-238), 
Howard Willardsen, (T. 224, 225, 230, 232), Richard Jensen 
(T. 214, T. 219), and Moroni Feed by Clifford Blackham (T. 
193, 195, 198, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212.) that they be-
came concerned about Comanche Construction Company not 
paying their suppliers and labors, consequently, before mak-
ing their final payment the Respondents (Moroni Feed, How-
ard Willardsen and Art Shand for himself and Richard Jen-
sen) in Clifford Blackham's office phoned Appellants and 
were advised by H. J. Rasmussen, of Appellant Company, 
who had issued a prior lien waiver on Clifford Blackham's 
personal pole barn job, to make their payments to Comanche 
Construction Company. In the event Appellant hadn't ad-
vised them to so pay, they wouldn't have made the payments. 
The appellant's General Manager, C. H. Child testified 
that appellant employed H. J. Rasmussen as a bookkeeper, 
but that he did not have any authority to issue lien waivers. 
(T. 149, line 11) 
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TIBBS CROSS EXAMINATION C. H. CHILD: 
"Q. :rvlr. Child, did Apex Lumber and Hardware Com-
pany have a man by the name of H. R. Rasmussen 
employed for it in 1960 and '61? 
"A. l\Ir. Rasmussen was a bookkeeper at Apex Lumbe r. 
"Q. And so he was an employee working in the office 
Is that right? . 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. Did he have authority to issue lien waivers? 
''A. He did not. 
(Thereupon, Defendants Exhibit No. 43 
was marked for identification.) 
"Q. (By Mr. Tibbs.) I hand you what has been mark-
t:d as Defendants. Exhibit Nu. t3. and ask you what 
that is? 
"A. Receipt and waiver for one dollar for. doesn't say 
to whom. Doesn't say. Oh. Comanche Construc-
tion Company. It is on there. 
"Q. And it has for Comanche Constrncti0n for Clifford 
Blackham job. Isn't that what it says on it? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. So at least in this case he had authority to issue 
a lien waiver for this particular job. Isn't that 
true? 
"A. Yes it is. 
There were two Exhibits No. 43 and No. 53. both lien 
waivers which were signed by Appellant (H. J. Rasmussen). 
one was issued to Clifford Blackham (Exhibit No. 43) for his 
personal job and the other was issued to Ray Olsen (Exhibit 
No. 53), for his pole barn construction. 
Mr. Child, Appellant's General Manager, reluctantly 
admitted that it might have been done at his direction. (T. 270) 
"Q. Yes. Now you also stated on rebuttal, as I un-
derstand it, that Mr. Rasmussen had no authority 
to sign these lien waivers? 
"A. I also stated on direct testimony he had no au-
thority. 
"Q. But be that as it may, we have two jobs here, at 
least as to Cliff Blackham's and as to Mr. Olsen's. 
that he did execute a lien waiver. Is that true? 
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''A. Signed on the "ame day and obviously at my 
direction. 
"Q. So that at least for these two jobs he had author-
ity tu execute lien waivers. Is that right? 
"A. Authority delegated by me. 
''Q. But that doesn't show on the lien waivers, does it? 
"A. It is not. 
"Q. Is it your position that these lien waivers are no 
good then as to these two jobs? 
"A. It is not. 
"Q. So you are holding them out as having authority 
to do it, and did at that time, aren't you? 
"A. If I directed it. 
"Q. In November, at this time these two liens waivers 
were signed, you held him out to these individual<; 
as that he had authority to execute lien waivers, 
did you not"' 
'·.,:1,__ This is December. Tvir. Tibbs. 
"Q. All right. In December of 1960, when these two 
lien waivers were issued, you held them out and 
Apex Lumber held them out as having authority 
to issue lien waivers? 
"A. In these two cases. 
"Q. Well, you held him out, didn't you? 
"A. In these two cases. 
The Lien Waivers for two of the 13 pole barns con-
structed were issued by H. J. Rasmussen for Appellant. Cliff-
ord Blackham testified that before any of the four Respond-
ents herein named paid for the materials on these jobs that 
he phoned Apex Lumber Company, talked to H. J. Rasmussen, 
the man who signed his lien waiver, about the Respondents 
paying the balance due to Comanche Lumber (T. 204-212) 
and the Respondents' concern. Each of the respondents testi-
fied they paid the final payment due under their contracts 
in reliance on the telephone call made to appellant. The only 
reason they phoned appellant was to hold up payment in the 
event the appellant claimed funds for materials. (T. 212, T. 
214. T. 230, 232, T. 244.) 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S POINT I. The undisputed evidence proves 
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that plaintiff not only supplied the materials used by 
the contractor in constructing the building on defend. 
ants' land, but received only partial payment for the 
value of said materials. 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THE EVIDENCE SHOWS 
THAT APPELLANT FURNISHED SOME MATER-
IALS FOR 13 DIFFERENT POLE BARN CONSTRuc. 
TION JOBS, THAT MATERIALS WERE MOVED 
FROM JOB TO JOB AND THAT CONSTRUCTION 
ON THE JOBS WAS TAKING PLACE SIMULTAN. 
EOUSLY. THAT IN THE EVENT THE PAYMEN'fs 
HAD BEEN PROPERLY APPLIED ALL MATERIALS 
THAT COULD HA VE BEEN USED FOR RESPOND. 
ENTS' POLE BARNS WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID. 
The Comanche Construction Company contracted to 
build 13 pole barns for different owners. Not one of the own-
ers obtained a Contractor's Bond and each paid in full to 
Comanche Construction Company the contracted amount. 
Approximately a year after they had all been completed and 
paid for, the appellant filed suit against these Respondents 
and three others. Two suits were compromised, one was dis-
missed. The third from the last of the thirteen pole barns 
was constructed for Bruce Barton. He was not sued because 
Appellant's General Manager, C. H. Child stated he was 
orally advised by Raymond Clark to apply a certain $8,000.00 
payment on this Barton account. Barton testified he never 
even asked for any lien waiver. Mr. Child on his deposition 
stated the request came from Clark in writing (which he 
couldn't find) then at the time of trial (more than a year 
after deposition) he testified Clark told him personally. The 
conflict is shown in the statement of facts. 
There was a confusion of material between the 13 dif-
ferent jobs as there was a confusion of funds received for pay-
ment on the account. 
Guy L. Pittman, the General Supervisor for Comanche 
Construction Company in Utah testified: (T. 78, line 29) 
"Q. 
"A. 
In regards to the material that was hauled back 
and forth between jobs, how substantial was this 
haulage back and forth? 
You mean how much of it was hauled? 
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"Q. Yes. 
"A. Back and forth. Well, sometimes we would pro-
bably get a whole semi load of just three by threes 
in, and this was distributed to different jobs by 
our truck because most of these big semis would 
make one stop. 
"Q. In this case v .. rould you leave enough to complete 
the job at the initial site of unloading and then 
distribute the rest? 
''A. That is what we usually tried to do. The same 
thing happened on poles. 
'·Q. And was this uncommon or common? 
·'.\. This was a common procedure. 
APPELLANT'S POINT II. The undisputed evidence proves 
1.hat under the provisions of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, plaintiff has a cause 
of action against defendants for the unpaid value of 
materials supplied by plaintiff and used in the con-
struction of buildings on defendants' land. 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THERE WAS SUCH A CON-
FUSION IN THE USE OF MATERIALS FOR THE 13 
POLE BARNS CONSTRUCTED AND THE ACCEPT-
ANCE OF PAYMENTS THAT THE APPELLANT 
HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE RE-
SPONDENTS. 
The Respondents admit they did not obtain the bond 
required m1der 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated. However, the 
cause of action only arises in favor of the materialman when 
"payment for which has not been made". (14-2-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953). In this case the Jury in answer to a spe-
cial Question by the Court stated that payment had been 
made in full. 
Guy L. Pittman, General Supervisor of Comanche Con-
struction Company (T. 40) testified that each of the Respond-
ents paid for the materials by checks made payable to Com-
anche. 
Cliff Blackham testified that before the checks were 
delivered the Respondents were concerned over whether the 
material and labor had been paid for, so that he acting for 
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them phoned appellant to determine if payment should be paid 
to Comanche. On (T. 192) Blackham testified: 
"A. Mr. Shand and Mr. Willardsen came to my office 
because they were concerned about paying for, 
making the final payments on the buildings. 
"Q. Do you recall when this date was? 
"A. I think it is the 23rd of January, based on my 
telephone bill. 
''Q. When you say they were concerned about making 
the payments on the barn, what do you mean by 
that? 
"A. They wanted to be sure that the materials and 
labor were paid for and that when they paid their 
money the thing would be properly closed. 
. then on Page 195, Line 12, Mr. Blackham stated: 
"A. Well, I placed a call to Scherer Brothers Lumber 
Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Apex 
Lumber Company in Salt Lake City to Mr. Ras-
mussen, because Mr. Rasmussen had signed my 
lien waiver from Apex on my own personal build-
ing. At the time I gave my deposition I didn't 
remember who I spoke to, when I checked it out 
with the telephone company and got their infor-
mation I had talked to Mr. Rasmussen. And Mr. 
Rasmussen told us, told me that the accounts were 
clear and it was clear to go ahead and make the 
final payment to Apex Lumber Company. (Later 
corrected to mean Comanche Construction Com-
pany - Page 197, line 4 through line 9). And on 
this basis of this information these men went out 
and paid for the buildings and we paid for our 
Feed Company building, the final payment. 
On Page 197 Mr. Blackham also testified: 
"Q. Mr. Blackham, at my request did you also con-
tact the telephone company in Moroni to ask them 
if they had any records concerning this telephone 
call on January 23, 1961? 
"A. That is correct. 
Exhibit No. 50 is the telephone company record of the 
call. Exhibit 51 is the telephone bill of Moroni Feed Com· 
pany of the call. Exhibit 52 is Clifford Blackham's notes. 
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Exhibit 43 and 53 are lien waivers on two jobs (Blackham and 
Olsen) which show that Mr. Rasmussen issued lien waivers 
on two of the 13 pole barns constructed and that appellant 
held l1im out as being authorized to issue waivers. Obviously 
this appellant is estopped from complaining now after having 
adviocd these respondents to make payment as they did. 
APPELLANT'S POINT III. The court erred in accepting 
the Jury's answer to question three of the special ver-
dict, wherein the jury found that acceptance by plaintiff 
of contractor's unsecured promissory notes cOhstituted 
payment in full. 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THE COURT'S DECISION OF 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BASED UPON THE 
JURY'S ANSWERS TO ALL WRITTEN QUESTIONS, 
AND NOT JUST AS TO QUESTION NO. 3. EVI-
DENCE ABOUNDS THROUGHOUT THE RECORD 
UPON WHICH THE JURY FOUND THAT PAYMENT 
IN FULL HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY APPELLANT. 
Respondents contend that the Jury's answer to this 
question does not indicate that the jury relied solely upon the 
promissory notes as being payment. The manner of the pay-
ments from Raymond Clark and Comanche Construction Com-
pany would be reason enough for the jury to hold that appell-
ants had been paid. The matter of the Barton check and its 
application to the last job rather than to prior jobs is another 
reason the jury found payment. The jury could also have 
found payment by reason of the telephone call from Respond-
ents to appellant which has been discussed. 
In regards to the Promissory Note theory of payment 
which respondents argued without success to the court 
throughout the trial in the absence of the jury. Respondent 
contends it is not now material because the jury found pay-
ment without reliance upon it, instead relying upon the appell-
ant's being estopped because of the telephone call. 
However, Respondents did seriously contend that even 
without the telephone call the acceptance of the two Pro-
missory Notes from the third party Comanche Construction 
Company, a corporation, by appellant under these circum-
stances where the notes were given by a third party, for an 
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increased interest rate and for security for payment on a dis-
puted claim the question of whether or not they were payment 
should have been a question for the Jury and not the Court. 
See Tangaro vs. Manero, 13 Ut. 2nd 290, 40 Am. Jur. 2 
p. 715. See also 40 American Jurisprudence Section 92 p 781 
where it states that "the question whether a note is given and 
accepted as payment ordinarly is a question for the jury and 
the burden of proving this fact is upon the one having the 
affirmative of this issue. 
So also payment to an authorized agent will discharge 
the indebtedness, although the agent misappropriates the pay-
ment - 40 Am. Jur. Section 154, 94 ALR 779, 8 ALR 198. 
It is also well settled that a Note of the debtor, although 
unsecured, which is accepted by creditor in satisfaction of an 
unliquidated or disputed claim, operated in accord and satis-
faction barring an action on the original claim or debt. See 
Smoot vs. Checketts, 41 Ut. 211, 125 Pac. 412, 62 ALR 752. 
Where a third person makes the note as the corporation did 
in this case where before it was only the debt of an individual 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 421, and in 62 ALR 758 
cites cases holding payment regardless whether the note was 
paid. 
But regardless of this Note theory the payment question 
is no longer important because of the jury's answers to ques-
tion which gave the court reason to hold appellants estopped 
by reason of its conduct. 
APPELLANT'S POINT IV. The court erred in accepting 
the Jury's answer to Question Three of the Special 
Verdict, wherein the Court found that plaintiff's recov-
ery from the defendant was barred by estoppel. 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO 
THE COURT'S QUESTIONS 3, 4 AND 5 WERE 
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRODUCED 
AT THE TRIAL AND CONSTITUTED A SUFFICIENT 
BASIS FOR THE COURT TO HOLD THAT THE 
APPELLANT WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY 
REASON OF ESTOPPEL. 
As above stated in answer to appellant's Point II Guy 
Pittman, Supervisor for Comanche Construction Company, 
collected by check the sums due for materials from respond-
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ents. These respondents only made payment based upon the 
telephone conversation by Clifford Blackham with Mr. Ras-
mussen of appellant company. These respondents phoned to 
appellant because they were concerned that all materials be 
paid for. Appellant instructed them to pay as they did and 
appellant should be estopped from nov .. - denying payment. 
Blackham on (T 207) was asked by Attorney for Ap-
pellant. 
"Q. What you desired from Mr. Rasmussen of Apex 
was not whether materials were paid for but 
whether Comanche Construction Company was in 
default or behind with Apex Lumber? 
"The Court: Now do you have the question clearly in 
mind? If not, we will have the report read it. 
"The Witness: I have it in mind. 
"The Court: All right, You may answer. 
"My answer is that I simply wanted assurance that the 
final payments could be made without any com-
plications of legal action such as we are having 
today. I received that assurance from Mr. Ras-
mussen and on that basis we went ahead and made 
final payments on these buildings. 
Then on Line 13 he answered Mr. Griffith's further 
question: 
"Mr. Griffiths: Did you understand that the Shand job 
or the Willardsen job were completed? 
"A. I remember this much that I understand that 
these men were faced with the final payment right 
away and they wanted information as to whether 
or not they should make this payment and still be 
safe. And that is why we made the calls. I made 
no survey as to the status of these buildings. 
The Respondent Moroni Feed Company paid based upon 
the telephone call to Appellant. See Mr. Blackham Testimony 
on Page 210, line 8. 
"Q. So I rephrase my question to you, Mr. Blackham. 
Did you expect the materials to have been paid 
for on January 23, for your job? 
"A. When I talked to him on January 23, the assurance 
I received at that time that it was, that we could 
pay our bills, must have carried forth with me 
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until this time when I made final payment because 
we made these payments on the basis of what we 
learned from Apex Lumber Company's Mr. Ras-
mussen." 
On Page 212 Mr. Blackham answered further: 
MR. TIBBS: 
"Q. Do you have any other reason that you would 
call Apex Lumber Company? 
"A. No reason. No other reason. 
The Respondent Richard Jensen paid his account based 
on this telephone call. (T. 214). 
"Q. Mr. Jensen, prior to your paying Comanche Con-
struction Company did you have occasion to talk 
to anyone else concerning whether or not to pay 
Comanche Construction Company? 
"A. Oh, yes. I was much concerned and I talked to 
Art Shand. Art Shand said they had made an 
investigation and as far as he could see it was all 
right. He paid his. When he said that Cliff Black-
ham had made the calls to Apex and different 
companies that had furnished the material. 
''Q. Did you prior to your making this payment know 
about this telephone call of Cliff Blackham's? 
"A. Oh, yes, I remember I talked to Cliff Blackham 
in his office when I was after feed before I made 
the payment besides talking to Arthur Shand. 
"Q. Was it based upon this information that you in-
quired about that you made the final payment? 
"A. Yes. 
The Respondent Howard Willardsen paid his account 
based upon the telephone call. (T. 224) 
"A. There was a local man by the name of Neff De-
Leeuw employed by Comanche Construction Com-
pany and he informed me during the construction 
of my building that they were defaulting on their 
payments, getting behind on their payments on 
their labor. For this reason, and two others, I was 
very concerned about the solvency of Comanche 
Construction Company. 
"Q. So what did you do? 
"A. Well, before I made final payment, together with 
Art Shand, we went to the office of Clifford Black-
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ham asking advice. We have a lot of respect for 
Cliff. And he said he thought he should call the 
suppliers of material and see if Comanche was sol-
vent so to speak. 
"Q. Do you recall when this was, when it was you 
went to Cliff Blackham? 
"A. In my deposition I couldn't, but of course since 
we have traced this phone call. It is January 23. 
"Q. I see, now do you - - what happened on that time 
to the best of your recollection. 
"A. The call was placed to the company in Minnes941 
and Apex Lumber Company. 
"Q. Were you present when this call was placed? 
"A. I was present when the call was placed. 
"Q. Where were you at? 
"A. In the office of Clifford Blackham at Moroni. 
"Q. Who else was present? 
"A. Art Shand. 
"Q. So the three of you were sitting there. Is that 
correct? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. And what happened? 
"A. Well, of course I don't know, I didn't speak my-
self, but we received assurance from Cliff that it 
was all right with Comanche Construction, with 
Apex Lumber if we paid Comanche because ap-
parently they were solvent and they had no con-
cern about Comanche paying their bills. Certainly 
I wouldn't have paid it if I hadn't of had this 
assurance. 
"Q. And was it based upon this assurance that you 
heard during this conversation that you made this 
payment? 
"A. That is correct. 
"Q. Now that was on November, or correction, that 
phone call was on January 23 and you made the 
payment on January 28. Is that correct? 
"A. Correct. Correct. 
"Q. (By Mr. Tibbs) When you were sitting in this 
office did you hear Mr. Blackham talking on the 
phone? 
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"A. I did. 
The Respondent Arthur Shand paid his account based 
upon the· Telephone Call. (T. 238) 
"Q. Was it based upon this conversation with Apex 
Lumber Company that you paid this bill? 
"A. Absolutely. 
''Q. Did you have occasion to talk to Mr. Jensen 
sometime during this period? 
"A. I talked with Mr. Jensen several times. In fact 
he kind of relied on me to get this information 
because he was out there on the farm. And he 
asked me if I, to give him any information that 
I could gather. And I did. I both went out to 
see him and I called him on the phone, and he 
called me on the phone. 
"Q. Yoll told him about your going up and your 
phoning to make out, make sure it was all right 
to pay then? 
"A. Yes. I also called him and told him not to pay 
it prior to this, a week or so. 
Then again on Re-direct examination of Mr. Arthur 
Shand: 
BY MR. TIBBS; 
"Q. Would you have paid it if Apex Lumber hadn't, 
had told you not to? 
"A. No Sir, I would not. 
"Q. You paid it in reliance upon the conversation of 
that telephone call in Cliff Blackham's office. Is 
that correct? 
"A. Absolutely. 
The doctrine of equitable Estoppel must always be so 
applied as to promote the ends of justice and accomplisli that 
which ought to be done between man and man. Each case 
of Estopple must in the nature of things stand on its own 
bottom. 19 Am Jur Section 33, 106 ALR 1169. 
The cases themselves must be looked to and applied 
by way of analogy rather than rule. Equitable Estoppel is 
the principle by which a party who knows or should know 
the truth is absolutely precluded both by law and in equity, 
from denying, or asserting the contrary of any material fact 
which, by his words or conduct, has induced another, who 
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had right to rely on it, to believe and act upon them thereby 
changing his position in such a way that he would 
suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed 
- Public Utilities Commission vs. Jones, 54 Utah 111, 179 
p 745. 
In our case these Respondents because of what they 
had heard became concerned that the'ir payment on their re-
spective contracts would not go to pay the laborman and the 
materialman. They were Farmers, they didn't know any-
thing about Contractors Bonds, but they wanted in all fairness 
to protect the labors and materiahnen. They did what was 
reasonable by telephoning to this particular materiahnen Ap-
pellant to find out if they should pay the contract or should 
hold up to give appellant some protection. Appellant told 
them to go ahead and pay. He should be precluded now from 
saying: Well I made a mistake I shouldn't be bound. Let 
them pay again. Don't make me suffer because I led them 
to pay this person Raymond Clark with whom I was dealing. 
As the testimony indicated the only purpose of the 
call was to determine what the Respondents should do in re-
gards to making the payment. Appellant told them to pay. 
Comanche Construction Company. If appellant had not told 
them to pay respondents would not have paid. The Respond-
ents' payment was clearly based upon Appellant's answer on 
the telephone call. 
The court after receiving the Jury's answer to the ques-
tion concerning the telephone call had the obligation to decide 
whether or not the facts gave rise to an estoppel. This the 
Court did in rendering its decision of no cause of action. 
App~llant would have this high court on appeal believe 
that there was no estoppel because there was no false repre-
sentation by appellant and allegedly that the respondents knew 
at the time of final payment that the materials had not been 
paid. This is not so. 
An actual intent to mislead or defraud is not essential 
to the creation of an equitable estoppel. (19 Am Jur, Section 
46.) An intention to influence the action of the particular 
person claiming the estoppel is not necessary in all cases. It 
is enough if there was a holding out to all who might have 
occasion to act on the existence of a certain state of facts 
which they might assume to be true and upon which they 
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might act. The result of the particular conduct rather then 
~e intent is the criterion. 
In our case payment would not· have been made but 
for appellant's action on the telephone. To allow appellant 
to now say Respondents should not be harmed by its telling 
them to pay would not be fair. The respondents had a right 
to pay based upon this telephone conversation and the appell-
ants, as the court found, were estopped. 
APPELLANT'S POINT V. The Jury's Answers to the In-
terrogatories of the Special Verdict are not supported 
by the evidence, and the court erred in failing to direct 
a verdict for thP plaintiff notwithstanding the special 
verdict. 
RESPONDENTS' ANSWER: THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO 
COURTS QUESTIONS "ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Respondents deny the conclusion that the verdict was 
not supported by evidence. As heretofore set forth in this 
brief evidence is in abundance as to confusion of materials 
between jobs. 
The jury found there was no unpaid materials. The 
evidence would warrant this finding based on either the jury 
treating the payments made by Clark should have been ap-
plied against these respondents job, Barton check is good 
example, or that the payments made were based on the tele-
phone conversation. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is nothing in the record to indicate the Jury 
failed to answer the court's questio~ properly. The answers 
must all be read together with all the evidence as shown 
by the record. 
Tile trial court properly held that the Appellant has 
no cause of action_ag<!_inst the Respondents. To have held 
otherwise ':~~d have been-a mis~~:riage of Justice. 
Respectful 
\ 
' ~ 
~ 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
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